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This paper examines the architectural and secu-
rity impact of using commercially available, popu-
lar terminal servers to support thin clients within
the context of a high assurance multilevel network.
Seven potential local area network architectures
were analyzed for security and utility. Three se-
cure configurations were identified: Multiple Ter-
minal Servers in Series; Multiple Trusted Comput-
ing Base Extension-Enhanced Terminal Servers;
and Terminal Servers on a High Assurance Virtual
Machine Monitor.
Keywords: Multilevel Security, Thin Clients, Ter-
minal Servers, High Assurance
1 Introduction:
A serious problem associated with the develop-
ment of secure systems is that of object reuse. If
computing devices possess storage that can be ex-
ploited by malicious software to hide sensitive in-
formation, then an accomplice executing at a lower
sensitivity level can locate and reveal the informa-
tion. An effective approach to object reuse must
be developed for systems enforcing either identity-
based or label-based policies. Both the Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria [19] and the
Common Criteria [2] stipulate mechanisms to en-
sure that storage objects are voided prior to reuse.
As part of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
Multilevel Secure Local Area Network (MLS
LAN) project [16], we have investigated object
reuse in client PCs which may be used by a se-
quence of users who may negotiate single level ses-
sions at any of a number of non-discretionary sensi-
tivity levels. A project requirement is that the client
PCs support popular commercial operating systems
and application suites, such as Windows NT and
Microsoft Office. As a consequence, high assur-
ance object reuse is a significant challenge. At the
client, storage includes, for example: RAM (system
and graphics), Flash-ROM (BIOS firmware), regis-
ters, buffers, bridges, cache memory, and secondary
storage (hard drive). Before reuse at a new ses-
sion level or by a new user, these locations should
be purged of residual information. Certain popu-
lar operating systems, e.g. Windows NT, write to
their boot devices during a typical startup sequence.
Thus there must be writable persistent storage at the
PC–a serious concern for object reuse. Thin client
computing appears to offer a solution to this aspect
of the object reuse problem by relocating operating
system instances to a centralized server.
This paper presents an examination of the archi-
tectural and security impact of using commercially
available, popular terminal servers to support thin
clients within the context of a high assurance mul-
tilevel network. Related investigations associated
with our project examine other facets of the PC-
based object reuse problem [3]. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the
basic objectives and architecture of the NPS MLS
LAN are presented along with an overview of the
requirements for the trusted computing base exten-
sion to be located at client PCs. A brief review of
thin client computing is given in Section 3. This is
followed in Section 4 by an analysis of seven poten-
tial topologies for use of thin client terminal servers
in the MLS LAN. A summary and possible avenues
for future research complete the paper in Section 5.
2 A Multilevel Secure LAN
The NPS MLS LAN project is building a system
to provide controlled sharing of labeled information
while permitting users to access that information
through popular PC-based COTS personal and of-
fice productivity applications. Its architecture is












Figure 1. NPS Multilevel Secure LAN Archi-
tecture
The high assurance server (HAS) enforces the
security policy and controls access to information.
Application protocols run on the HAS and provide
services and access to shared resources. Each PC
is to be equipped with a Trusted computing base
(TCB) extension (TCBE) plug-in board that will
provide TCB support at the workstation. From
these clients, users log on to the TCB, establishing
an identity for audit and access control purposes.
The first major application service to be imple-
mented in the LAN is mail. Individual components
are discussed below.
2.1 Trusted Mail Server
The Trusted Mail Server consists of a high assur-
ance TCB, which enforces critical security policy,
and untrusted mail server instances constrained by
the TCB. The server supports sharing and label-
ing and is functionally equivalent in terms of over-
all application-level protocol support to an existing
mail server. Thus it is compatible with existing
COTS mail client packages such as Lotus Notes,
Outlook and Netscape 1.
On the high assurance platform the mail service
application is instantiated within single level sub-
jects at several access classes. The result is a mul-
tilevel mail server supporting controlled sharing of
individual files. The University of Washington In-
ternet Mail Access Protocol (IMAP) [1] mail server
has been ported to the high assurance platform [10].
Adaptation of the mail server application permits
the user view of the system of mailboxes at or be-
low the user’s current session level.
Both the mail spool and the mail boxes of indi-
vidual users are stored at the high assurance server.
We take advantage of the existing file system pro-
vided by the TCB. Initial experiments using the
Elm user agent software provided a starting point
for server organization [9]. Continuing research has
allowed us to consider a variety of options for orga-
nizing mail folders.
2.2 High Assurance Base
The Wang XTS-300 provides our high assur-
ance base. The principal technical consideration
in choosing the high assurance base for the mail
server was its ability to enforce security policy. The
high assurance TCB, by virtue of the protection do-
mains it creates, provides confidence that malicious
code will neither cause the exfiltration of sensitive
data nor the corruption of information of higher
integrity. Other factors included ease of use, avail-
able software tools, and interfaces. The principal
non-technical consideration was the availability of
software and hardware maintenance support.
1These application names: Lotus Notes, Outlook, and
Netscape, are trademarked by their respective owners.
The high assurance server is defined by the broad
properties needed for a viable commercial prod-
uct. Our definition of a high assurance base is a
TCB already on the Evaluated Products List (EPL)
with a Class B3 or higher digraph based upon an
evaluation against the TCSEC or its network inter-
pretation [20].
Modifications to XTS-300 TCB networking in-
terfaces contribute to the support of the following
desired functions: (1) a trusted path between client
workstations and the XTS-300, (2) session-level
negotiation at the XTS-300 from the client worksta-
tions, and (3) single-level session communications
on the Ethernet for client workstations at different
session levels. Our modifications permit multiple
clients at different access classes to communicate
with the server through a single physical network
device [7].
2.3 Client Workstations
To insure that object reuse requirements would
be met, workstations are considered to be, in effect,
“diskless,” with sufficient volatile RAM-disk capa-
bility to support a wide variety of user applications.
The workstation TCB extension will satisfy object
reuse requirements by ensuring that RAM and other
volatile primary and secondary storage at the work-
station are purged with each change of session level
or new user login at the workstation.
2.4 Trusted Computing Base Extension
To extend the TCB across the network, the archi-
tecture includes a trusted computing base extension
(TCBE) at each COTS workstation [14, 5]. This
component provides the following services:
 A secure attention key (SAK) that permits
users to establish unambiguous communica-
tion with the high assurance TCB for un-
spoofable presentation and capture of security
critical data at the user interface. The secure
attention key must be available at all times.
 Protected communication channels between
the TCB and the TCBE. These protected com-
munications are based upon protocols that
support both the establishment and mainte-
nance of trusted path, and session-level com-
munications.
 Mechanisms to ensure high assurance object
reuse at the client PC. These mechanisms must
address both primary and secondary storage.
 Controlled delivery of operating system and
application software to client PCs. The TCBE
must insure that it has control of the client and
its resources at the time of boot and that con-
trol over security critical actions is maintained
throughout the client session.
The TCBE is based on an add-on card and is in-
tended to maximize compatibility with COTS prod-
ucts. A software-based experimentation base as
well as investigations of an Intel-based prototype
[25] permits initial examination of design choices.
3 Thin Client Computing
Long ago, all clients were thin; centralized com-
puting facilities provided computational services to
dumb terminals. For example, Multics [21] was
intended to provide a centrally managed comput-
ing utility similar to typical utilities such as elec-
tric power and gas. The introduction of inexpen-
sive workstations and PCs resulted in a paradigm
shift. The desktop became autonomous and central-
ized services were used for network and application
support services. Distributed computing took ad-
vantage of factors including: less expensive equip-
ment, more sophisticated users, improved user in-
terfaces, increased redundancy and heterogeneity
[26]. These advantages combined with other fac-
tors produced a new set of problems including: lack
of management control; imprecise synchronization;
conflicting or absent standards; poorly understood
configuration interaction; the inability of general-
purpose desktop platforms to provide optimum per-
formance for all tasks; and the inability to support
massive applications.
The problem of system maintenance alone pro-
vides a compelling reason for reexamining a cen-
tralized computing framework [11]. In Plan 9, the
creators of Unix shifted computationally intensive
activities back to a high-powered central system
[22]. Newer thin client architectures relegate only
display functions to the client. In some thin clients,
specific protocols require the client to execute oper-
ating system or application-specific [18] graphical
interfaces[8] [6], while the thinnest of clients are
truly dumb, with complete screen buffers transmit-
ted from the central computing facility [15] [24].
Thin client computing provides advantages with
respect to object reuse. First, the operating system
does not boot on the client. Some popular COTS
operating systems, e.g. Windows NT, must write
to their boot devices, which then must be volatile.
This presents an object reuse problem since the
boot device can be used to store salvable informa-
tion. There is no guarantee that the information
being written by the OS will be constant, so in-
tegrity checks such as bootstrap ratchets [4], would
be infeasible. In contrast, the protocol support and
graphics functions for thin clients can be stored
in non-volatile memory, and volatile memory can
be purged between sessions. Another advantage
is centralized management of the operating system
and applications, which can provide better guaran-
tees that updates are consistent across the network.
4 Terminal Server Topologies
Three logical components comprise a typical ter-
minal server architecture. The first is a multi-user
server, the second is a protocol interface between
the server and the client, and the last is client soft-
ware that permits each PC on the LAN to act as
a terminal. A terminal server delivers the graphi-
cal user interface and keyboard services to clients,
while operating system and application processing
takes place on the server itself.
Terminal servers provide a way to run modern
COTS operating systems within the context of ob-
solete hardware. This is accomplished through a
type of terminal emulation characterized by the
capture and transmission of a computer (terminal)
keyboard keystrokes and mouse events to a separate
computing device (the server) for processing. The
processing system then returns changes in graphics
displayed on the PC’s (terminal’s) screen.
The topology of a small terminal server LAN is
shown in Figure 2. The terminal server provides






Figure 2. Basic Terminal Server Architec-
ture
of users with low to moderate requirements for net-
work activity and CPU usage.
An enterprise-level terminal server-based LAN
where users have high network and CPU usage
requirements is depicted in Figure 3. Many ter-
minal/OS servers and application servers work to-
gether to provide adequate support to users. The
application server balances the load for processor-
intensive applications, reducing stress on terminal
server cluster processors. The question addressed
in the following analysis is: Can any configuration











Figure 3. Enterprise Terminal Server Archi-
tecture
servers be secure? The configurations considered
will build upon the basic MLS LAN (Figure 1). We
will assume that the PCs act as if they were thin
clients, without permanent, writable storage.
4.1 Case 1: Terminal Server as a LAN Peer
The topology in Figure 4 represents the simple
addition of the terminal server to the MLS LAN.
The high assurance server and the client/TCBE
work as depicted in the basic LAN (Figure 1).
The terminal server is added to deliver the operat-
ing system (and client applications) to the client.














Figure 4. Terminal Server as Peer
configured to communicate with a terminal server.
Each PC is enhanced with a TCBE to support the
trusted path, and encrypted communications with
the high assurance server. The user would invoke
the secure attention key (SAK) for authentication
to the TCB and session level negotiation. Then
the TCBE would permit the thin client operating
system to be loaded and the user would be authen-
ticated to the terminal server. The terminal server
would then process all keyboard/mouse actions at
the client. The terminal/application server could
run an e-mail client at the terminal server and would
access IMAP e-mail services running on the high
assurance server (HAS). The IMAP server allows
the user to access mail at classifications dominated
by the session level negotiated with the high assur-
ance server.
Analysis: This configuration is efficient and
scales well. The number of users on a single server
could range from fifteen to forty-five depending
upon usage patterns. If the expected number of
PCs is large, the terminal server would expand to
a cluster of single or multiple processor terminal
servers running load balancing software to optimize
efficiency. The terminal server on the LAN allows
the terminal server to process the bulk of the net-
work traffic without the interference of the high
assurance server. Thus the high assurance server
is involved only with trusted path and protocol ser-
vices such as e-mail services.
In this architecture, all communications between
the TCBE and the high assurance server are pro-
tected. Following identification and authentication
with the HAS, communications in the network re-
quire the terminal server. There is no high assur-
ance component at the terminal server to protect
those communications.
Another vulnerability is in the terminal server
itself. A typical terminal server will support, at
most, no more than discretionary access controls
(DAC) with low assurance. Such systems are vul-
nerable to malicious code. Individual users may
become the victims of Trojan Horses. A “HIGH”
user might unwittingly execute a Trojan Horse in
the background and write information to a place ac-
cessible by a “LOW” user. Malicious code could
take advantage of system flaws to acquire unre-
strained access to all memory in the system. This
code could grab information from another’s mem-
ory space and copy it into its memory space for
exfiltration. Finally, all users must log onto the ter-
minal server for access to supported applications.
The single terminal server caches data for its own
efficiency and information could be found in swap
files maintained on permanent media. Current ter-
minal servers’ capabilities can only separate user
processes with low assurance, if any, and this lack
of isolation is insufficient to meet the MLS LAN as-
surance requirements. Numerous timing and stor-
age channels could be exploited on this unevaluated
platform.
4.2 Case 2: Single Terminal Server in Series
with High Assurance Server
Figure 5 shows a configuration in which the
terminal server is attached to the high assurance
server. All communications between the client and
the terminal server are mediated by the high as-














Figure 5. Terminal Server in Series with
HAS
server are attached as in the basic LAN, so the
trusted path and session negotiations are as de-
scribed in section 4.1. The significant difference
is that the clients are not in direct communication
with the terminal server. This allows all commu-
nications on the LAN to be protected through the
use of high assurance mechanisms. After authen-
ticating to the TCB, a connection to the terminal
server would be created that would permit support
of the thin client. The bulk of the traffic on the
network would be the communications between the
terminal server and the client PCs for processing
keyboard/mouse events, and graphical display ob-
jects. For example, if the user wishes to access
e-mail, he/she must first activate the e-mail client in
the terminal server. This communications path is:
COTS PC client through TCBE to high assurance
server to terminal server. The application is acti-
vated on the terminal server and makes a request to
the high assurance server on behalf of the user. This
communications path is: terminal server to high as-
surance server. The high assurance server passes
the information to the terminal server which is then
displayed to the client. This path is: high assurance
server to terminal server to HAS to client/TCBE.
Analysis: The communications paths described
above burden the HAS with significant communi-
cations processing. This configuration does not
scale effectively. To handle a greater number of
users and the attendant increase in traffic, additional
HASs as well as the terminal servers must added to
the LAN.
Security for LAN traffic is improved in this con-
figuration as the HAS server and the TCBE at the
client PC provide high assurance control over all
LAN communications. There is no improvement in
the security at the terminal server; it is still inca-
pable of keeping data of different sensitivity levels
separate with low, if any, assurance. There are
still vulnerabilities to malicious code running at the
application layer. Flaws in the operating system un-
derlying the terminal server could be exploited.
4.3 Case 3: Single TCBE-Enhanced Terminal
Server
Figure 6 shows a MLS LAN with an enhanced
terminal server. Equipped with a terminal server
TCBE that allows it to communicate securely with
the client/TCBE and the HAS, the terminal server
operates as a peer with the HAS.
This is very similar to Case 1. The obvious dif-
ference is the presence of a terminal server-TCBE
(TS-TCBE) at the terminal server. This TS-TCBE
is capable of supporting high assurance protection
of network communications, and may even conduct
a controlled bootstrap of the terminal server host. It
differs from the client TCBEs in that it must be able
to manage communications associated with each
client PC logged onto the terminal server.
A typical session would begin as in Case 1.
When user authentication and session level nego-
tiation has completed, a protocol can be used to
establish protected communications between the
client TCBE and the terminal server TCBE. A dis-















Figure 6. TCBE Enhanced Terminal Server
authenticated client. One or more separate pro-
tected communication channels between the ter-
minal server TCBE and the HAS can be estab-
lished. This communication channel would be used
to transmit messages to the IMAP server instance
on the high assurance base to and from all terminal
server instances at a particular security level.
Analysis: This configuration allows more ef-
ficient runtime communication between the client
and the terminal server because it does not involve
the HAS as a pass through. It allows for protected
communications on the LAN thus securing data in
transit. In this respect, it is an improvement over
Case 1.
This configuration does not improve security of
data within the terminal server. The terminal server
still has the same internal vulnerabilities, as de-
scribed for Case 1.
4.4 Case 4: Per-Sensitivity-Level Unenhanced
Terminal Servers
In this configuration, physically separated termi-
nal servers support each classification level within
the MLS LAN ( Figure 7). Each terminal server
has direct access to the LAN and supports only one
classification level. This system builds upon Case 1
by physically partitioning terminal servers into dis-
crete system high domains. A user who attempts
to access data at level “HIGH” and below will ac-
cess the data only through the “HIGH” terminal
server. Similarly a user who attempts to access
data at “LOW” will only access the data through the
terminal server designated “LOW”. Session startup
proceeds as follows. The user at the client PC in-
vokes the system in a fashion similar to that of
Case 1 by powering on the system and/or pressing
the SAK. The HAS controls identification and au-
thentication and session level negotiation. When
complete, the HAS may connect with the terminal
server for the session level. The user’s PC will then
complete the connection with that terminal server
and begin the session.
Analysis: The terminal servers are not enhanced
with TCBEs as in Case 3 and so have no high
assurance protected communications channel be-
tween: (a) the terminal server and the Client/TCBE,
and (b) the terminal server and the HAS. So, com-
munications between the terminal server and other
LAN elements are protected only by the less trusted
mechanisms of the commercial product.
Physical separation between the terminal servers
does not increase security; this configuration suf-
fers the same problems as Case 1: open attacks to
data in transit by malicious listeners on the LAN,
and exfiltration of data within the terminal server
itself. Per session data are vulnerable.
Besides its security problems, this configuration
is not scalable to networks requiring a large num-


















Figure 7. Per-Sensitivity-Level Unen-
hanced Terminal Servers
servers than PCs may be required in a highly com-
partmented operational environment.
4.5 Case 5: Multiple Terminal Servers in Se-
ries with High Assurance Server
The architecture in Figure 8 combines those of
Cases 2 and 4. The terminal servers are connected
to the high assurance server so that all communi-
cations between the clients and the terminal servers
is mediated by the high assurance TCB. The con-
nections between the terminal servers and the high
assurance server are single level and the terminal
servers are unable to access the LAN directly. As
in Case 2, the HAS will authenticate users. Because
each terminal server is running at a single level that
cannot be spoofed, commercial mail clients exe-
cuting on the terminal servers can request services
from the IMAP server instances at the high assur-
ance platform and can have multilevel access to
mail.
Analysis: Security is good in this topology: re-
quirements for multilevel access to data can be met,
and the terminal servers are confined to a single
security level so sensitive information cannot be
leaked. This architecture suffers from the same
bandwidth problems described in Case 2: all traf-
fic between clients and the terminal servers must


















Figure 8. Multiple Terminal Servers in Se-
ries with High Assurance Server
scalability problems noted in Case 4 are possible in
highly compartmented environments.
4.6 Case 6: Multiple TCBE-Enhanced Termi-
nal Servers
In this topology (Figure 9), TCBE front-ends are
applied to each terminal server. The presence of the
TCBE on each terminal server allows the terminal
servers to communicate securely with the TCBEs




















Figure 9. Multiple TCBE-Enhanced Termi-
nal Servers
cessful identification, authentication, and session
level negotiation between the user working through
the client TCBE can be used within the LAN to pro-
vide the client with protected access to the terminal
server at the appropriate session level. The TCBE
at the terminal server can ensure that only those
clients authorized by the HAS can avail themselves
of its services. The terminal server will have a pro-
tected communication path with the HAS, so it can
access HAS-managed data at all sensitivity levels
permitted by network security policy.
Analysis: This configuration provides high as-
surance of network security policy enforcement.
Clients are allowed to access information at or be-
low the negotiated session level. Each client ac-
cesses the terminal server corresponding to its cur-
rent session level. Terminal servers work on behalf
of clients in tandem with resident client applica-
tions and are able to successfully access only data
at or below the terminal server level. The HAS en-
forces the multilevel security policy, managing and
storing data at a range of session levels. Trusted
components ensure that LAN communications are
protected.
Although attacks within a closed sensitivity level
are possible, there would be no compromise of non-
discretionary security policy. This approach does
suffer from the same scalability problem encoun-
tered in Case 4: support of many sensitivity levels
will result in many terminal servers and a prolifer-
ation of platforms.
4.7 Case 7: An Ideal Solution - A Secure Vir-
tual Machine Monitor for Terminal Servers
The topology in Figure 10 represents a hypothet-
ical LAN that uses a secure virtual machine monitor
(VMM) to logically separate instances of the ter-



















Figure 10. Terminal Servers Running on a
Secure VMM
capable of creating and controlling virtual replicas
of a particular processor and its operating environ-
ment including address space for RAM and any
permanent media required. A VMM would be able
to create isolated environments for multiple oper-
ating systems or operating system instances. A
secure VMM would provide assurance that infor-
mation is confined within security levels. KVM
provided an early example of a VMM embracing
the notion of high assurance policy enforcement
by a security kernel [13, 12]. The Class A1 VAX
VMM is an example of such a system [17]. For the
purposes of the MLS LAN, the VMM would pro-
vide a virtual machine for instances of the terminal
server. For each classification level, a separate ter-
minal server able to support multiple clients at that
level could be dynamically created. To make this
architecture widely available, the VMM should ex-
ecute on a commodity processor. Recent analysis
has demonstrated that the Intel Pentium processor
is not virtualizable [23], so a different processor
would be needed.
Analysis: Network security policy is supported
by the three trusted elements in the LAN. The
HAS enforces policy through separation of data;
the secure VMM enforces policy through the cre-
ation of virtual machines at different sensitivity
levels; and the TCBE supports a SAK, unspoofa-
ble interfaces, protected communications channels,
and object reuse controls at the client workstation.
Whether a VMM could support a large enterprise
in this configuration is a matter for future analysis.
5 Summary
This paper has presented an analysis of seven
architectures for incorporation of terminal servers
into a high assurance multilevel local area network.
Three secure configurations were identified: Mul-
tiple Terminal Servers in Series; Multiple TCBE-
Enhanced Terminal Servers; and Terminal Servers
on a High Assurance VMM. The first is likely to
suffer from performance problems due to the place-
ment of the HAS between the terminal servers and
the PC-based clients. In addition, this configuration
will not scale well to environments requiring many
sensitivity levels. The second architecture also suf-
fers from the same scalability problem. The VMM
approach is ideal, however, at this time it is only
hypothetical as no highly secure and trustworthy
VMMs are available.
5.1 Future Work
Our analysis shows that current options for us-
ing terminal servers in a high assurance context
with many sensitivity levels are impractical. For the
MLS LAN project we are considering other options
for provision of operating system and application
clients to the PCs located on the LAN. These will
be discussed elsewhere.
The hypothetical, yet from the security perspec-
tive ideal, solution merits further consideration. A
high assurance VMM could dynamically support
virtual machine instances at any access class. With
no storage at thin clients, the danger of improper
object reuse between sessions is substantially re-
duced and the benefits of centralized software man-
agement accrue.
Each client would need to be equipped with a
TCB Extension to provide: (1) A secure attention
key (SAK) that permits users to establish unam-
biguous communication with the high assurance
TCB for unspoofable presentation and capture of
security critical data at the user interface. (2) Proto-
cols support for protected communication channels
between the TCB and the TCBE. (3) Mechanisms
to ensure high assurance object reuse at the client
PC. (4) Controlled startup and delivery of software
to client PCs. Recent developments in thin client
computing have resulted in major simplifications
and reduction of the thin client, e.g. SLIM [24],
and make this approach particularly attractive. The
scalability of such architectures must be examined.
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